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NOTE
TITLE VI OR BUST?
A PRACTICAL EVALUATION OF TITLE VI OF
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AS AN
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REMEDY
Scott Michael Edson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Waterfront South neighborhood of South Camden, New Jersey
has become a critical battleground for the environmental justice
movement. Activists and commentators within the movement are
intently watching a citizens' group's fight against a corporation that
is attempting to open an industrial facility in Waterfront South, a
poor and predominately minority community.1 The citizens' group,
* Duke University School of Law candidate for J.D. 2005; Edi-
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derkuffler, Duke University School of Law, for her counsel, advice,
and supervision in the preparation of this Note. Also, I would like to
thank Professor Sarah Sun Beale, Charles L.B. Lowndes Professor
of Law, Duke University School of Law for believing in me when I
did not always believe in myself. And of course, I want to thank my
family for their continuing love and support.
1. See generally Sara Hoffman Jurand, "Environmental Justice"
Movement Looks to Pivotal New Jersey Cases, 39 TRIAL 12 (July
2003) (discussing the Waterfront South saga and its importance to
the environmental justice movement); see also Keith E. Eastland,
Note, Environmental Justice and the Spending Power: Limits on
Using Title VI and § 1983, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1603
(2002) ("Proponents of environmental justice are well pleased with
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South Camden Citizens in Action ("SCCIA"), is claiming, in part,
that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's
("NJDEP") decision to issue environmental permits for the industrial
facility constitutes intentional discrimination in violation of Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2 which prohibits discrimination in fed-
erally-funded programs. Environmental justice commentators, activ-
ists, and attorneys are watching closely as these events unfold, wait-
ing to see what the saga will reveal about Title VI's effectiveness as
a legal remedy for fighting similar permitting decisions in other parts
of the country.3
This Note assesses the effectiveness of Title VI, in its present state,
in helping environmental justice advocates fight the siting of locally
undesirably land uses ("LULU"s) in poor and/or minority communi-
ties. In making this assessment, this Note focuses on litigation strat-
egy and accordingly does not question the ends sought by the litiga-
tion; leaving empirical and normative debate for other fora. This
Note also assumes the existence of an "environmental justice crisis."
That there is a colorable claim of such a crisis suffices for the pur-
poses of this Note.
Part II of this Note describes the environmental justice crisis and
the movement which has developed in response. Part II.A uses Wa-
terfront South's plight as an anecdotal illustration of the environ-
mental justice problem. Part II.B looks at the environmental justice
movement on a larger scale and attempts to develop a working defi-
nition of both environmental justice and the specific goal sought by
those who pursue it, particularly with respect to LULU sitings.
In Part III, this Note examines Title VI, its pertinent regulations,
and its relevant case law. Part III.A outlines Title VI's statutory
scheme, as well as, the regulations promulgated by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to implement Title VI.
the South Camden residents' initial success and have been touting
their new legal strategy as 'a road map for environmental justice ad-
vocates."').
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (2000).
3. See generally Jurand, supra note 1 (discussing the Waterfront
South saga and its importance to the environmental justice move-
ment); see also Eastland, supra note 1, at 1603 ("Proponents of envi-
ronmental justice are well pleased with the South Camden residents'
initial success and have been touting their new legal strategy as 'a
road map for environmental justice advocates."').
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Part III.B explores the Supreme Court's most recent decision on
point, Alexander v. Sandoval,4 in which the Court held that Title VI
does not provide a private right of action to enforce disparate impact
regulations promulgated under its provisions. Part lII.C details the
South Camden5 proceedings to date and discusses what they reveal
about the rights of action available under Title VI.
Part IV takes the law developed in Part III and uses it to examine
the effectiveness of Title VI remedies for achieving the goals of the
environmental justice movement, pointing out aspects that environ-
mental justice activists and attorneys should consider in deciding
whether Title VI action is appropriate. Part IV.A looks at Title VI
remedies on their own terms while Part IV.B looks at Title VI reme-
dies in relation to other remedies and strategies available to envi-
ronmental justice attorneys and advocates.
In Part V, this Note concludes that as Title VI case law develops,
environmental justice attorneys should neither rely exclusively on
Title VI remedies nor ignore them completely. Instead, this Note
argues, they should practically weigh the effectiveness of remedies
offered by Title VI on an ad hoc basis in light of other options and
develop strategies that best serve the specific needs and interests of
the communities that they represent.
II. "ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE"
A. Waterfront South
The story of Waterfront South typifies the problem identified by
environmental justice advocates. 6 According to the 1990 census, the
4. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
5. South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
254 F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.N.J 2003) (hereinafter South Camden IV);
South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274
F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) (hereinafter South Camden III); South Cam-
den Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d
505 (D.N.J. 2001) (hereinafter South Camden I1); South Camden
Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446
(D.N.J. 2001) (hereinafter South Camden I).
6. This description is based on Judge Orlofsky's account in
South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d. at 458-68, where the plaintiffs,
2004]
144 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
South Camden community was 91 percent minority, had an average
annual per household income of $15,082, and had greater than 50
percent of its residents living at or below the federally defined pov-
erty line.7 By contrast, in 1990 Camden County, where Waterfront
South is located, was 75.1 percent non-Hispanic white and had an
average per household income of $40,027; more than 2.5 times that
of Waterfront South.8
But neither poverty nor its majority-minority demographics are
Waterfront South's most distinctive attributes. The neighborhood is
most notable for its overabundance of LULUs; many of which are
among the most objectionable uses of property. Waterfront South's
2,132 residents, 9 40 percent of whom are children, 10 share their little
community with Camden County's sewage treatment plant," the
Camden County Resource Recovery facility, a trash-to-steam incin-
erator, and a cogeneration power plant. 2 Additionally, Waterfront
South has several industrial facilities, including an oil refinery.' 3 By
2001, fifteen sites within Waterfront South had been identified by
NJDEP as contaminated, and two sites within the neighborhood had
been designated as Federal Superfund sites.
14
SCCIA and private individuals, were granted a preliminary injunc-
tion.
7. South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
8. See id. (listing the per household incomes for Waterfront
South and Camden County).
9. Id. at 458.
10. Id.
11. Id. The sewage treatment plant, operated by the Camden
Country Municipal Utilities Authority, treats sewage for approxi-
mately 35 Camden County municipalities.
12. Id. A cogeneration power plant is "an industrial facility that
converts waste energy to produce heat and electricity" through com-
bustion.
13. Id.
14. Id. Superfund sites are those designated by the federal gov-
ernment for the cleanup of hazardous materials pursuant to the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-28 (2000). One of Waterfront
South's two sites was discovered to be contaminated with radioac-
tive thorium in 1981. South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d. at 459.
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In spite of, or perhaps partly because of, Waterfront South's con-
centration of LULUs, the St. Lawrence Cement Company ("SLC"),
decided that the neighborhood was the best location for the new
GrandChem 1 factory it wanted to build on the U.S. eastern sea-
board. 16 Once opened, the GrandChem facility would release par-
ticulate matter, mercury, lead, manganese, nitrogen, oxides, carbon
monoxide, sulfur oxides and volatile organic compounds into the
air.17 Additionally, SLC's plans called for approximately 77,000
trucks per year to pass through the streets of Waterfront South, de-
livering the raw granulated blast furnace slag to the facility and re-
moving finished GrandChem from the facility. 8
In response to SLC's siting decision and NJDEP's decision to is-
sue environmental permits to that facility, residents of Waterfront
South formed SCCIA, an unincorporated community organization,
and began fighting the permitting of the facility.' 9 On October 4,
2000, SCCIA filed administrative complaints with the United States
EPA's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") and with NJDEP.20 On Feb-
ruary 13, 2001, SCCIA filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey against NJDEP and its commis-
sioner seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21
B. The Big Picture: National "Environmental Justice"
Waterfront South's saga is not unique. One need not dig deeply
into environmental justice literature to discover similar tales of dis-
15. GrandChem is an additive used to strengthen portland cement
and is made from grinding granulated blast furnace slag ("GBFS"), a
byproduct of the steel-making industry. Id. at 453.
16. Id. SLC decided on Waterfront South after considering other
locations in Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. Id. SLC's
chosen location was within one-half mile of four sites that the EPA
had or would soon investigate for the release, or threatened release,
of hazardous substances. Id. at 459.
17. Id. at 454.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 452.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 450. For a discussion of the legal issues raised in the
complaint, see infra Part III.C.
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advantaged communities, besieged by LULUs, battling the nearby
siting and opening of more waste transfer stations, sewage treatment
plants, or mercury-releasing factories.22 Collectively, this grassroots
activity combines to form the national "environmental justice
movement.,
23
While it is difficult to determine the precise moment the contem-
24porary environmental justice movement began, many scholars
point to protests in 1982 that took place in the predominately Afri-
can-American, rural Warren County, North Carolina. The Warren
County protests sought, unsuccessfully, to prevent the siting of a
25polychlorinated biphenyl ("PCB") landfill. Following the Warren
22. See, e.g., LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE
GROUND UP; ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 80-102 (2001) (describing
environmental justice activism in Buttonwillow, California); see
also, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism, in
Toxic STRUGGLES: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE 25, 30-32 (Richard Hofricter, ed. 2002) (recounting briefly
environmental justice activism in Los Angeles since the early
1980s); Winona LaDuke, A Society Based on Conquest Cannot be
Sustained: Native Peoples and the Environmental Crisis, in ToxIc
STRUGGLES, supra, at 98 (detailing the disparate impact of undesir-
able land use on native peoples across North America).
23. See generally, e.g., COLE & FOSTER, supra note 22; Bullard,
supra note 22; LaDuke, supra note 22.
24. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 22, at 19 ("Pointing to a par-
ticular date or event that launched the Environmental Justice Move-
ment is impossible, as the movement grew organically out of dozens,
even hundreds, of local struggles and events and out of a variety of
social movements.").
25. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice For All, in
UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 3, 3-5 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994) (dis-
cussing environmental justice struggles as early as 1967 and assert-
ing that "it was not until the early 1980s that a national movement
for environmental justice took root . . ."). Bullard, in his discussion
of pre-1982 environmental justice actions, argues that Rev. Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr. was engaged in an environmental justice mission
when he was shot and killed in Memphis in 1968 while attempting to
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County protests, which were led by the head of the United Church of
Christ's Commission for Racial Justice ("CRJ"), the CRJ conducted
and released a landmark study documenting the disproportionate
impact of environmental hazards on racial minorities. 6 Over the
past two decades, the environmental justice movement, largely char-
acterized by grassroots activism, has sought to remedy the disparate
impact of land use on unempowered communities.
The grassroots nature of the environmental justice movement has
been both its biggest asset and its most significant shortcoming. On
the one hand, unempowered communities faced with the siting of
LULUs can engage people by relying on the personal connection felt
between citizens and the movement; this connection has fostered
empowerment and has been instrumental in helping to crystallize
27local support. On the other hand, the decentralized nature of the
movement makes coalition-building and coordination of strategies
difficult, if not impossible.
One detrimental result of the environmental justice movement's
piecemeal nature has been a persistent definitional ambiguity. Envi-
ronmental justice is a term often used but seldom defined in a mean-
ingful manner. For example, Professor Robert Bullard of the Envi-
ronmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University, one
of the movement's leading activists and scholars, has defined the
movement as seeking to eliminate "unequal enforcement of envi-
ronmental, civil rights, and public health laws. 28 While this aspira-
tion encapsulates the spirit of the movement, it translates poorly into
strategy. Bullard's description fails to give activists any real point of
reference against which gains and losses (both potential and actual)
can be measured. In the absence of a concrete and discrete goal,
improve working conditions and pay for striking African-American
garbage workers. Id. at 3-4.
26. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 22, at 20-21 (citing the CRJ
study in discussing the foundations of the environmental justice
movement following the Warren County protests).
27. For an example of local community activism defeating the
decision to site a LULU, see Bullard, supra note 22, at 30-31 (dis-
cussing how community activism in South Central Los Angeles led
the city to "kill" a project which would have placed three waste-to-
energy incinerators in its neighborhood).
28. See Jurand, supra note 1, at 12 (discussing the Waterfront
South saga and quoting Professor Bullard).
20041
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potential means of attaining that goal can hardly be effectively
evaluated.
At its core, the "environmental justice" sought by activists is the
equitable distribution of environmental hazards across society, re-
gardless of imbalances in political, social, or economic power. With
this in mind, environmental justice activists are essentially seeking to
prevent and mitigate the disproportionate impact of LULUs on po-
litically, socially, or economically marginalized populations.
While this characterization might exclude some of the goals Pro-
fessor Bullard and his colleagues pursue (such as eliminating the
disparate impact of environmental hazards not related to LULUs,
including squalid working conditions and lead-based paint) or deem-
phasize the racial component of the "environmental justice crisis"
(which some activists may consider the critical aspect), it captures
the crux of what the residents of Waterford South and similar com-
munities are trying to accomplish. Thus it provides a concrete point
from which the effectiveness of remedies, including those available
under Title VI, can be assessed and will therefore serve as a helpful
reference for developing this Note. Ultimately, this attempt to define
both "environmental justice" and the goals of its advocates could
prove helpful in developing environmental justice strategies in the
future.
IH. THE TITLE VI CLAIM
A. Title VI and the EPA 's Regulations
In 1964, Congress passed, and President Lyndon Johnson signed,
historic legislation which became known as the Civil Rights Act of
1964.29 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in
federally-funded programs. Section 601 of Title VI,30 its general
provision, provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program receiving Federal financial assistance."
31
29. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (78 Stat.) 252.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, Title VI, § 601 (78 Stat.) 252.
31. Id.
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To implement section 601's general discrimination prohibition,
section 60232 authorizes and directs federal agencies to promulgate
rules preventing recipients of agency funding from engaging in dis-
crimination. 33 Under section 602, federal agencies are empowered
to force the compliance of their funding recipients (such as NJDEP,
which receives EPA funding 34) with section 602 regulations by ei-
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; Act of July 2, 1964 Pub. L. No. 88-352,
Title VI, § 602 (78 Stat.) 252.
33. See id. ("Each Federal department and agency which is em-
powered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or
activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of
insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the
provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect to such program
or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applica-
bility which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of
the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with
which the action is taken."). The exact relationship between sections
601 and 602 was a subject of contention between the majority and
dissent in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). For a dis-
cussion of Alexander v. Sandoval, see infra Part ILI.B. Ultimately,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that section 602
was created to implement section 601, not to define it, and that it
therefore creates no private right of action to enforce its regulations.
See id. at 293 ("Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended
does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding right of action
to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602. We therefore hold
that no such right of action exists.").
34. EPA's website has a searchable database of recipients of EPA
funding. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Grants Information and Control System (GICS) Query Form, avail-
able at http://www.epa.gov/enviro/html/gics/gics-query.html (last
visited Aug. 10, 2004). Other recipients of EPA funding include the
states of Arizona and Alaska, state environmental regulatory agen-
cies, such as the Alabama Department of Environmental Manage-
ment and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, cit-
ies, such as Buffalo, NY and Kansas City, MO, universities, such as
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Presidents
and Fellows of Harvard University as well as countless other public
and private institutions. See id. (providing a searchable data base of
EPA grant recipients).
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ther denying funding or employing "any other means authorized by
law."
35
Pursuant to section 602, the EPA has promulgated regulations
which prevent discrimination by recipients of EPA funding. 36 These
regulations apply to "all applicants for and recipients of, EPA assis-
tance [including state environmental protection agencies, such as
NJDEP] in the operation of programs or activities receiving such
assistance beginning February 13, 1984." 37 To effectuate this, the
regulations charge OCR with the responsibility of administering and
developing EPA's compliance under Title VI and other applicable
civil rights legislation.
38
Subpart B of these regulations, codified at 40 C.F.R. sections 7.30-
7.35, prohibit discrimination in EPA-funded programs on the basis
of race, color, national origin, or sex. Section 7.30, the general pro-
hibition, commands that "[n]o person shall be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program receiving EPA assistance on the basis of race,
35. See 42 U.S.C § 2000d-1 ("Compliance with any requirement
adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termina-
tion of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such pro-
gram or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an ex-
press finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure
to comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal
shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or
other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made and, shall
be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in
which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other
means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action
shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised
the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the
requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured
by voluntary means.... .") (emphasis added).
36. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.10-7.135 (2003) (implementing
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other antidiscrimination
legislation).
37. 40 C.F.R. § 7.15 (2003).
38. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.20(a) (2003) ("The EPA Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) is responsible for developing and administering
EPA's compliance programs under the [relevant civil rights] Acts.").
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color, national origin, or sex .... 39 Section 7.35 catalogues the
specific types of discrimination which are prohibited.4 ° In section
7.35(b), recipients are prohibited from using "criteria or methods of
administering its program which have the effect of subjecting indi-
viduals to discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin,
or sex .. ,"41 thereby prohibiting conduct by recipients which dis-
proportionately impacts racial or ethnic minorities, regardless of the
motivation behind that conduct.
Section 7.35(c), directly addresses the siting of LULUs by recipi-
ents of EPA funding, providing:
A recipient shall not choose a site or location of a facility
that has the purpose or effect of excluding individuals
from, denying them the benefits of, or subjecting them to
discrimination under any program to which this part ap-
plies on the grounds of race, color, or national
origin ...or with the purpose or effect of defeating or
substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objec-
tives of this subpart [prohibiting discrimination based on
race, color, national origin, or sex] .42
It is noteworthy, however, that the text of section 7.35(c) only dis-
cusses the "choosing" of a site with a prohibited purpose or effect,
not the granting of permits for the site. Thus, one could argue this
provision does not apply where a recipient agency merely grants
permits to a private entity (as NJDEP does), as long as the private
entity that chose the site does not receive EPA funding. 44 Still, such
39. 40 C.F.R. § 7.30 (2003). Note that this provision is written in
the passive form and neither says who the contemplated discriminat-
ing party would be nor the mode of discrimination. See id.
40. Section 7.35(d), however, implies that section 7.30's scope is
broader than the provisions of section 7.35. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(d)
(2003) ("The specific prohibitions of discrimination enumerated
above do not limit the general prohibition of § 7.30."). Thus, one
could claim a violation of the overarching goal of section 7.30, even
where no specific provision of section 7.35 had been violated. See
id.
41. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2003) (emphasis added).
42. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c) (2003) (emphasis added).
43. See id.
44. In South Camden I, discussed infra Part III.C., the district
court rejected the defendants' argument that EPA regulations do not
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permitting decisions would have to comply with other disparate im-
pact regulations, such as section 7.35(b) (which prohibits the use of
criteria or methods with the effect of subjecting individuals to dis-
crimination) and section 7.35(d) (which prohibits subjecting persons
to discrimination contained in section 7.30). Thus, even a narrow
interpretation of section 7.35(c) would not allow recipients of EPA
funds to make permitting decisions without considering the potential
discriminatory effect of the proposed site. The penumbral prohibi-
tions in section 7.35 seem to require a disparate impact analysis in
all decisions made by recipients of EPA funding.
Other EPA regulations in Part 7 implement prohibitions and pro-
vide remedies for the violations of those prohibitions. Section
7.90(a) requires each recipient to "adopt grievance procedures that
assure prompt and fair resolution of complaints which allege viola-
tions of [Part 7's provisions]. 45 It should be noted, however, that
this provision does not require that any specific procedures be
adopted, other than those needed to "assure a prompt resolution of
complaints. 46 Thus, though section 7.90(a) ensures aggrieved par-
ties some procedure for bringing complaints to the attention of a re-
cipient, the recipient is largely left to its own devices in deciding
what remedy, if any, is appropriate in a given case.47
Subpart E of Part 7 creates EPA compliance methods. The general
policy for these procedures is set out in section 7.105, which directs
EPA officials to "seek the cooperation of applicants and recipients in
securing compliance with [Part 7] .... ,,8 The ensuing regulations
require recipients to consider the Title VI issues when issuing per-
mits. See South Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 475-76 (D.N.J.
2001) (rejecting the defendants' argument that EPA regulations only
required recipient state agencies to comply with emission standards
before issuing permits and citing, inter alia, section 7.35(c)).
45. 40 C.F.R. § 7.90(a) (2003).
46. Id.
47. See id. Section 7.90(b) merely provides an exception to sec-
tion 7.90(a)'s requirement for recipients with fewer than fifteen full-
time employees unless the OCR finds a violation of Part 7 or "de-
termines that creating a grievance procedure will not significantly
impair the recipient's ability to provide benefits or services." 40
C.F.R. § 7.90(b) (2003).
48. 40 C.F.R. § 7.105 (2003).
[VOL. XVI
TITLE VI OR BUST
provide the procedures for remedial action to force compliance,49
complaint investigations, the coordination of efforts with other
agencies, the remedies available to EPA for obtaining compliance
52
and the process to regain eligibility which recipients and applicants
have lost.
53
Among these provisions, section 7.130 is of particular import to
aggrieved parties as it discusses how EPA can obtain the compliance
of a defiant recipient. Subsection (a) provides, where informal
means cannot assure compliance, "EPA may terminate or refuse to
award or to continue assistance." 54 Further, section 7.130(a) author-
izes EPA to use any other means allowed by law, including referring
the matter to the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). 55
Section 7.130(b) sets out the procedures by which EPA can insti-
tute the remedial measures authorized in section 7.130(a). Under
section 7.130(b)(1), when OCR determines that a recipient is in vio-
lation of Part 7, proceedings are instituted against that recipient, and
where voluntary compliance cannot be achieved, OCR is directed to
make a finding of noncompliance and notify the recipient of this
finding and of its procedural rights.56 The remainder of section
7.130(b) lays out the appropriate procedures for a hearing to contest
the initial OCR finding,57 the process by which an applicant or re-
cipient's disposition becomes finalized, 8 and for the scope of any
49. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.110 (2003) (providing pre-award compli-
ance regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 7.115 (2003), (providing post-award
compliance regulations).
50. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (2003).
51. Id. § 7.125 (2003).
52. Id. § 7.130 (2003).
53. Id. § 7.135 (2003).
54. Id. § 7.130(a) (2003).
55. Id.
56. See id. § 7.130(b)(1) (2003) (discussing the procedures for an
initial finding by OCR that an applicant or recipient has been non-
compliant with Part 7).
57. See id. § 7.130(b)(2) (2003) (discussing the procedure for an
applicant or recipient to contest and initial OCR finding of noncom-
pliance).
58. See id. § 7.130(b)(3) (2003) (providing for default judgments,
the opportunity for all parties to be heard in any hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge, and for the decision to deny an applica-
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decisions to terminate, annul, suspend or deny funding based on a
violation of Part 7.59 The final provision of Part 7 provides for the
procedures by which a recipient or applicant who has had its EPA
funding denied, annulled, terminated, or suspended can regain eligi-
bility for funding.
60
Noticeably absent from section 7.130 is a mechanism by which an
outside party can institute proceedings against a recipient. With no
formal procedures for bringing a claim through EPA, outside parties,
such as environmental justice attorneys, who seek to enforce these
regulations, must persuade the OCR to make an initial finding of
noncompliance. If OCR and EPA refuse to institute section 7.130
proceedings against the recipient or applicant, no remedy is available
through EPA to outside parties who claim harm due to violations of
Part 7's provisions. Thus, any formal Title VI remedies available to
environmental justice attorneys must come from a private right of
action.
B. Alexander v. Sandoval: The Supreme Court Taketh Away
In 2001, the Supreme Court considered the scope of private rights
of action provided by Title VI.61 The specific question presented to
the Court was "whether private individuals may sue to enforce dispa-
rate-impact regulations under [section 602 of] Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. ' '62 On its way to answering the question in the
negative, the Court shed some light on potential rights of action
available under Title VI. A deeper understanding of Sandoval is
tion or annul, suspend, or terminate assistance to become effective
thirty days after the a report is sent to the Congressional committees
with legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity affected).
59. See id. § 7.130(b)(4) (2003) (providing that a decision which
results in the denial, suspension, annulment, or termination of fund-
ing to an applicant or recipient is limited to that applicant or recipi-
ent and that its affects should be similarly limited).
60. See id. § 7.135 (2003) (providing procedures for regaining
eligibility).
61. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that
no private right of action exists to enforce disparate impact regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to section 602 of Title VI).
62. Id. at 278.
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helpful, if not necessary, for assessing the effectiveness of Title VI
action to achieve "environmental justice."
Sandoval decided this much: no private right of action exists to en-
force disparate impact regulations (or, for that matter, any other
regulations) promulgated under section 602.63 In addition, given the
Court's analysis, it is practically certain that section 601 provides a
private right of action for injunctive relief and damages 64 but only
for intentional discrimination. 65 However, Sandoval was less clear
on other points, calling into question the validity of section 602 dis-
parate impact regulations but leaving the issue unresolved66 and
similarly leaving open whether, if valid, such regulation can be en-
forced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.67
In 1990, the State of Alabama amended its constitution and de-
clared English as the state's official language. 68 To implement this
63. Id. at 293 ("Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended
does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right
of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602. We there-
fore hold that no such right of action exists.").
64. See id. at 279 ("First, private individuals may sue to enforce §
601 of Title VI and obtain both injunctive relief and damages.").
65. See id. at 280 ("Second, it is similarly beyond dispute-and no
party disagrees-that § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimina-
tion.").
66. See id. at 281 ("Third, we must assume for the purposes of
deciding this case that regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title
VI may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on
racial groups, even though such activities are permissible under §
601."); id. at 282 ("These statements [in prior concurring and dis-
senting opinions which indicate that disparate impact regulations
under § 602 are valid] are in considerable tension with [holdings in
other cases] that § 601 forbids only intentional discrimination ... but
petitioners have not challenged the regulations here.").
67. See id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Litigants who in the
future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in
all likelihood must only reference § 1983 to obtain relief; indeed, the
plaintiffs in this case (or other similarly situated individuals) pre-
sumably retain the option of rechallenging [the policy challenged in
Sandoval] in a complaint that invokes § 1983 even after today's de-
cision.").
68. Id. at 278-79.
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provision, and to promote public safety, the Alabama Department of
Transportation began administering its driving tests exclusively in
English.69 In 1998, a class action was filed against the Department
of Transportation in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama, claiming that the English-only policy violated
DOJ Title VI section 602 disparate impact regulations because the
policy had the effect of discriminating against non-English speakers
on the basis of their national origin.
70
The district court granted the class a preliminary injunction and
ordered the Department of Transportation to accommodate non-
English speakers. 7' The Department of Transportation appealed and
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
injunction. 72 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to de-
termine if Title VI provides a private right of action to enforce the
section 602 disparate impact regulations under which the plaintiffs
had filed suit.
73
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that there was no private
right of action under Title VI to enforce section 602 disparate impact
regulations, and therefore, the Plaintiffs' claim was to be dis-
missed.74 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia took three as-
pects of Title VI "as given., 75 First, Scalia took for granted that a
69. Id. at 279.
70. See id.
71. Id. (citing Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala.
1998)).
72. Id. (citing Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (1 1th Cir. 1999)).
73. Id. (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000) for
the grant of certiorari and the question presented).
74. Id. at 293 ("Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended
does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right
of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602. We there-
fore hold that no such right of action exists.. .. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals [affirming the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction
and ordering the defendants to accommodate non-english-speakers]
is reversed.").
75. Id. at 279 ("Although Title VI has often come to this Court, it
is fair to say (indeed, perhaps an understatement) that our opinions
have not eliminated all uncertainty regarding its commands. For
purposes of the present case, however, it is clear from our decisions,
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private right of action exists under section 601 of Title VI for both
76injunctive relief and damages. Second, Scalia understood section
601 to prohibit only intentional discrimination. 77 Finally, Scalia as-
sumed that section 602 regulations can proscribe activities that cause
a disparate impact on protected classes, even if section 601 only pro-
hibits intentional discrimination.
7 8
Scalia accepted that private individuals may sue for damages and
injunctive relief to enforce section 601. 7 9 Though not necessary to
Sandoval's holding, and never directly reached by the Court previ-
ously, the existence of such a right appears beyond question fol-
lowing Sandoval. Both the majority and the dissent treated the right
of action under section 601 as well established,81 leaving little doubt
that the Court would find a private right of action under section 601
if the question were ever directly presented to it.
82
Still the existence of a private right of action has no meaning with-
out an understanding of the scope of that right. Justice Scalia's sec-
from Congress's amendments of Title VI, and from the parties' con-
cessions that three aspects of Title VI must be taken as given.").
76. Id.
77. Id. at 280.
78. Id. at 281.
79. Id. at 280.
80. See id. at 279-80 (relying on Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441
U.S. 677 (1979), and stating that the Court has never directly ad-
dressed whether section 601 provides a private right of action). The
majority cited Cannon as finding a private right of action under Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1964 by analogizing to and re-
lying on the existence of a right of action under Title VI, citing no
other case for the private right of action under Title VI. See id.
81. See id. at 280 ("It is thus beyond dispute that private individu-
als may sue to enforce § 601."); id. at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[T]his Court has repeatedly and consistently affirmed the right of
private individuals to bring civil suits to enforce rights guaranteed by
Title VI.").
82. Id. at 280 (bolstering its conclusion that Congress intended a
private right of action under section 601, the majority noted that a
1986 Amendment to Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2000), abro-
gated state sovereign immunity against suits brought in federal court
to enforce Title VI and provided that remedies at law and at equity
would be available).
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ond "given," that section 601 only prohibits intentional discrimina-
tion, foreclosed a section 601 remedy to plaintiffs who cannot show
that a discriminatory intent motivated the actions of defendant re-
cipients.83 After briefly piecing together the convoluted web of plu-
ralities and concurrences which constitutes the Court's Title VI ju-
risprudence, 84 Justice Scalia found emphatically that "Title VI itself
directly reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination. '" 85
This language, and the Court's holding that the plaintiffs had no pri-
vate right of action under Title VI for disparate impact discrimina-
tion, appears to establish that section 601 only proscribes conduct
taken because of, not simply in spite of, a racially discriminatory
impact.
83. See id. ("Second, it is similarly beyond dispute-and no party
disagrees-that § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination.").
84. Id. (citing precedent from a line of cases including Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) and Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978)).
85. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281 (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted). In Justice Scalia's
attempt to drive home the point that section 601 reaches only inten-
tionally discriminatory conduct, however, he left the door slightly
cracked to the possibility of litigation on the issue in the future. Jus-
tice Scalia noted that the parties did not dispute that section 601 only
reached intentional discrimination. Id. at 281 n. 1 ("Since the parties
do not dispute this point, it is puzzling to see why Justice STEVENS
go out of his way to disparage the decisions . . . ."). As this indi-
cated that the issue was never properly presented to the Court, there
is some room for the issue to be litigated in the future if one believes
Justice Stevens's statement that "[o]ur conclusion that [Title VI]
only encompasses intentional discrimination was never the subject of
thorough consideration by a court focused on that question." See id.
at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 642 (1983) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (discussing the Court's Title VI precedent and concluding
that, pursuant to it, "proof of invidious purpose is a necessary com-
ponent of a valid Title VI claim."). It should be noted, however, that
limiting Title VI to intentional discrimination was necessary to the
Court's holding that no private right of action exists under Title VI
disparate impact regulations.
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After determining that section 601 of Title VI only prohibits inten-
tional discrimination, the Court made the final assumption that sec-
tion 602 disparate impact regulations are valid despite section 601's
limited scope. 86 Unlike the Court's previous two "givens," however,
the majority had no intention of indicating that this assumption was
well established or reliable. Immediately after assuming the validity
of the regulations, Justice Scalia noted that "no opinion of this Court
has held that.",87 Though Scalia did mention that four Justices in
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of
New York8 8 had voiced their belief in the validity of section 602 dis-
parate impact regulations, "at least on alternative grounds, ' 89 he
quickly cautioned that "[t]hese statements are in considerable tension
with the rule of Bakke and Guardians that § 601 forbids only inten-
tional discrimination." 90 In the end, Justice Scalia grounded the as-
sumed validity of the regulations in a stipulation by the Alabama
Department of Transportation, not on legal grounds, 91 leaving the
issue largely unresolved.92
A source of considerable disagreement between the majority and
the dissenters in Sandoval was the interrelationship between sections
601 and 602. An understanding of this relationship was crucial to
86. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281 ("[W]e must assume for the
purposes of deciding this case that regulations promulgated under §
602 of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate
impact on racial groups, even though such activities are permissible
under § 601.").
87. Id.
88. 463 U.S. 582, 610-12, 642 (1983).
89. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82.
90. Id. at 282.
91. See id. (". . . but petitioners have not challenged the regula-
tions here. We therefore assume.., that
the... regulations proscribing activities that have a disparate impact
on the basis of race are valid.").
92. Indeed, this assumption can be read simply as a manifestation
of judicial restraint. Had the Court ruled on the validity of the regu-
lations, it could have potentially affected any regulations which went
beyond the scope of the statute under which they were promulgated.
Since the Court held that there was no private right of action, it did
not need to determine the validity of the regulations and was able to
avoid a weighty issue.
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the Court's holding as, under the Court's implied-private-right-of-
action jurisprudence, the text and structure of the statute alone de-
termines whether a right of action is to be implied. 93 Justice Ste-
vens's dissent argued that section 602 authorizes federal agencies to
give concrete meaning to section 601's "antidiscrimination ideals"
94
and, therefore, the regulations promulgated under section 602 pro-
vide enforceable rights as they help to define the singular Title VI
right of action. 95 The majority, however, found that section 602
merely implements section 601; relying on a lack of legislative intent
to create a right of action under the statute, the majority held that
section 602 does not create an independent right of action." Thus,
following Sandoval, section 602 merely authorizes federal agencies
to promulgate regulations implementing section 601.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggested a separate avenue which
could provide a private right of action to enforce section 602 dispa-
rate impact regulations: a claim for deprivation of rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 97 Section 1983 is the general federal statute that pro-
93. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-88 (discussing the Court's implied-
right-of-action jurisprudence and concluding "[w]e therefore begin
(and find we can end) our search for Congress's intent with the text
and structure of Title VI.").
94. See id. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Section 601 does not
stand in isolation, but rather as part of an integrated remedial
scheme. Section 602 exists for the sole purpose of forwarding the
antidiscrimination ideals laid out in § 601.").
95. See id. at 3 10 ("If the regulations promulgated pursuant to §
602 are either an authoritative construction of § 601's meaning or
prophylactic rules necessary to actualize the goals enunciated in §
601, then it makes no sense to differentiate between private actions
to enforce § 601 and private actions to enforce § 602. There is but
one private action to enforce Title VI, and we already know such an
action exists.").
96. See id. at 289 ("Far from displaying congressional intent to
create new rights, § 602 limits agencies to "effectuat[ing] rights al-
ready created by § 601.").
97. See id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Litigants who in the
future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in
all likelihood must only reference § 1983 to obtain relief; indeed, the
plaintiffs in this case (or other similarly situated individuals) pre-
sumably retain the option of rechallenging Alabama's English-only
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vides a private right of action against anyone acting "under color of"
state authority that deprives any person of "any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws." 98 For plaintiffs to
enforce section 602 disparate impact regulations under § 1983, those
regulations would first, have to be valid and second, create a federal
right which § 1983 could enforce. With no guidance from the
Sandoval majority on either of these issues, the extent to which sec-
tion 602 disparate impact regulations can be enforced under § 1983
remains an open issue in Sandoval's wake. 99
policy in a complaint that invokes § 1983 even after today's deci-
sion.").
98. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2003). Though the body of law and commen-
tary surrounding § 1983 is voluminous (its notes take up about two-
and-one-half volumes in the United States Code Annotated, see 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983), a basic understanding of its text is sufficient for
understanding the possible cause of action identified in Justice Ste-
vens's dissent.
99. See generally Joseph Ursic, Note, Finding a Remedy for Envi-
ronmental Justice: Using 42 U.S. C. § 1983 to Fill in a Title VI Gap,
52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 497 (2002) (concluding "[i]t is difficult to
definitively say whether the Supreme Court would hold that a private
litigant may bring a section 1983 claim on the basis of disparate im-
pact discrimination against a recipient of federal funds under the
EPA's implementing regulations promulgated pursuant to section
602."); but see South Camden III, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) (hold-
ing that EPA's section 602 disparate impact regulations are not en-
forceable through § 1983); Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 1983 prohibits the violation
of rights not laws and therefore the plaintiffs could not maintain a
private right of action for violation of the United States Department
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C. South Camden
Perhaps Judge Orlofsky should have waited a week. On April 19,
2001, just five days before the Supreme Court released its opinion in
Sandoval, he issued a preliminary injunction against NJDEP 100 and
SLC, vacated permits issued by the NJDEP to SLC for the Grand-
Chem facility, and remanded the case to NJDEP to make appropriate
findings-all in favor of SCCIA, which sued to enforce section 602
disparate impact regulations. 10 1 The afternoon that Sandoval was
released, Judge Orlofsky held a telephone conference during which
the parties agreed to brief two issues in light of Sandoval: (1)
whether SCCIA was entitled to a preliminary injunction under sec-
tion 601 of Title VI based on intentional discrimination and, (2)
whether SCCIA's preliminary injunction based on disparate impact
could be justified through a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.102 On May 10,
Judge Orlofsky released an opinion holding that SCCIA could main-
tain its cause of action under § 1983 and issued an order that both
maintained the original injunction and denied an SLC motion to stay
the injunction pending appeal. 103
To bring a claim under § 1983, SCCIA had to show, as a prelimi-
nary matter, that it has sued a "person" for § 1983 purposes and that,
of Transportation's Title VI disparate impact regulations as such
regulations create laws to be complied with by recipients, not rights
protecting people affected by those recipients).
100. NJDEP receives EPA funding and, thus, must comply with the
regulations. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Grants Infor-
mation and Control System, supra note 34 (listing NJDEP as a re-
cipient of EPA grant money); see also South Camden L, 145 F.
Supp. 2d 446, 450 (D.N.J. 2001) ("The NJDEP receives federal
funding and is thus obliged to conform its operations to the restric-
tions imposed by Title VI and the regulations which have been
promulgated to implement Title VI.").
101. South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. at 446. For the facts, as al-
leged, in South Camden I, see supra Part II.A.
102. South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505, 509 (D.N.J. 2001).
103. Id. at 509. Because Judge Orlofsky concluded that SCCIA
was entitled to preliminary injunctive relief for the § 1983 disparate
impact claim, he withheld judgment on the issue of whether SCCIA
was entitled to that relief based on their alternative section 601 inten-
tional discrimination claim. Id. at 509 n.2.
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"under color of state law," that person deprived SCCIA of "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."'
10 4
Though states are not "persons" under § 1983,105 state officials sued
for injunctive relief in their official capacity qualify. 106 Accordingly,
Judge Orlofsky determined that the NJDEP commissioner, whom
SCCIA had sued for injunctive relief, was a "person" for § 1983
purposes; SCCIA's claim passed the initial hurdle.
10 7
SCCIA next had to show that Title VI, section 602 disparate im-
pact regulations provide a "right," the deprivation of which would
open the commissioner to § 1983 liability.1 8 Judge Orlofsky ex-
plored whether the EPA section 602 disparate impact regulations
under which SCCIA had sued in fact created such a right by apply-
ing the Blessing v. Freestone'°9 three-step analysis.'l°
Under the Blessing test, a rebuttable presumption is created in fa-
vor of the right asserted where the plaintiff shows that (1) Congress
intended the provision in question to benefit the plaintiff, (2) the
right asserted is not "so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement
would strain judicial competence," and (3) the "statute unambigu-
104. Id. at 525 ("Section 1983 limits liability to any person who,
under the color of state law, subjects any citizen of the United States
to a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by
the Constitution and laws.").
105. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);
accord South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (quoting Will).
106. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (noting that state officials sued for
injunctive relief are "persons" under § 1983 because "official-
capacity actions for injunctive relief are not treated as actions against
the state."); accord South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (quot-
ing Will).
107. See South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 525 ("Under the Su-
preme Court's holding in Will, it is clear that the Plaintiffs' claim
against Commissioner Shinn, for prospective injunctive relief, falls
within the ambit of § 1983.").
108. See Id. at 526.
109. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
110. See South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d. at 529 ("The inquiry I
must now under take is whether the EPA's Title VI implementing
regulations, codified at 40 C.F.R. § 7.1 et seq., create rights enforce-
able under § 1983").
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ously impos[es] a binding obligation on the States.""' If the plain-
tiff satisfies these steps, the presumption of the existence of an en-
forceable right can be rebutted only by a showing that "Congress
specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983." ' 12 In finding that
EPA's section 602 disparate impact regulations create an enforceable
right, Judge Orlofsky first determined that this analysis applies to
regulations as well as statutes 1 3 and then that the EPA's section 602
disparate impact regulations passed the Blessing test.' 14
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed." 15 In holding that the regu-
lations did not create a federal right, the Third Circuit greatly limited
the availability of § 1983 claims to enforce regulations which are not
enforceable through the statute pursuant to which they were promul-
gated:
The Supreme Court's primary concern in considering en-
forceability of federal claims under section 1983 has been
to ensure that Congress intended to create the federal
right being advanced. Accordingly, we hold that a fed-
eral regulation alone may not create a right enforceable
through section 1983 not already found in the enforcing
statute. Similarly, we reject the argument that enforce-
able rights may be found in any valid administrative im-
plementation of a statute that in itself creates some en-
forceable rights." 6
Thus, in the Third Circuit,"17 § 1983 cannot be used by plaintiffs,
as Justice Steven's dissent in Sandoval had argued,' 18 and SCCIA
111. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (internal quotations omitted);
accord South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (quoting Blessing).
112. Id. at 341; accord South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 519
(quoting Blessing).
113. South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 526-29 (concluding "that
valid federal regulations which have the 'force and effect of law,'
may create rights under § 1983.").
114. See id. at 529-46 (examining the history of section 602 dispa-
rate impact regulations, applying the Blessing test to the EPA's sec-
tion 602 disparate impact regulations and concluding that the regula-
tions create a right enforceable under § 1983).
115. South Camden III, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001).
116. Id. at 790 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
117. The Supreme Court subsequently denied a writ of certiorari,
see South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
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was left without any cause of action to enforce the disparate impact
regulations. '1 9
Unwilling to concede its claim, SCCIA amended its complaint
again. SCCIA now claimed: (1) NJDEP issued the permits to SLC
with a discriminatory intent in violation of section 601 of Title VI;
(2) the discriminatory impact of the proposed plant violated the Fair
Housing Act;' 20 and, (3) SLC's proposed site constituted both a pub-
lic and a private nuisance. In addition, SCCIA claimed a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
122
and based on the Equal Protection claim, a violation of § 1983.123
536 U.S. 939 (2002), and the Ninth Circuit has come to the same
conclusion, see Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding that § 1983 provides no private right of action
for a violation of the United States Department of Transportation's
Title VI section 602 disparate impact regulations).
118. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 at 300 (2001) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) ("Litigants who in the future wish to enforce the
Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only
reference § 1983 to obtain relief. .. ").
119. Indeed, the Third Circuit recognized the importance of its de-
cision to both the plaintiffs and to other activists. See South Camden
III, 274 F.3d at 790 ("We emphasize that the implications of this
case are enormous and obviously, as the appearance of the many
amici curiae attests, have not been lost on interested parties.").
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2000). The Federal Fair Housing Act
was passed as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-284, 82 Stat. 81.
121. South Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 489 (D.N.J. 2003).
The nuisance claims were only directed against SLC. Id.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 ("No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.").
123. South Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 494-95. For a discus-
sion of § 1983, see supra Part III.B. SCCIA's second amended
complaint also included claims based on the EPA's disparate impact
regulations through both section 602 of Title VI and § 1983 but, pur-
suant to Sandoval and South Camden III, SCCIA conceded that they
should be dismissed. Id. at 492.
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To support the section 601 discriminatory intent claim, SCCIA
made thirteen specific allegations.124  Among these allegations,
SCCIA asserted: (1) the NJDEP relied exclusively on environmental
emission standards in making its permit decision to avoid the known
racial disparate impact of the site; (2) NJDEP knew that it was in
violation of EPA's Title VI disparate impact regulations when it ap-
proved the site;125 and, (3) NJDEP "engaged in a statewide pattern
and practice of granting permits to polluting facilities" in locations
where those facilities disparately impacted minorities. 126 SCCIA
essentially claimed that NJDEP's knowledge of the site's discrimina-
tory impact on racial minorities, combined with its history of permit-
ting sites with a discriminatory impact on minorities, was probative
of a discriminatory intent.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss all claims pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 127 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a
claim should be dismissed where "it appears beyond a doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief."1 28 Relying on this "beyond a doubt"
standard, Judge Orlofsky allowed the plaintiffs to proceed on their
section 601 intentional discrimination, Equal Protection, § 1983, and
124. Id. at 493 n.4.
125. SCCIA did not indicate whether they were alleging that
NJDEP knowingly violated intentional discrimination or disparate
impact regulations. It should be noted that, in spite of the Supreme
Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001),
NJDEP would still have had to comply with the disparate impact
regulations, as well as the intentional discrimination regulations. In
holding that private individuals could not sue to enforce Title VI
disparate impact regulations, the Supreme Court expressly assumed
that such regulations were valid and, thus, would have applied to
NJDEP. See 532 U.S. at 282 (assuming that Title VI section 602
disparate impact regulations are valid even if Title VI section 601
only proscribes actions taken with a discriminatory intent). For a
discussion of Sandoval, see supra Part III.B.
126. South Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 493 n.4.
127. Id. at 492.
128. Id at 493 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957) and Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 495 (D.N.J. 1999)
(Orlofsky, J.)).
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private nuisance claims.129 The Fair Housing Act and public nui-
sance claims, however, were dismissed.
130
In allowing the intentional discrimination claims to go forward,
Judge Orlofsky made clear that his decision was not based on the
merits of the case, and that whether the plaintiffs could bring forth
enough evidence to both survive a motion for summary judgment
and prevail at trial remained to be seen.' 31 At the time of this writ-
ing, it still does.
IV. ASSESSING TITLE VI AS A REMEDY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
What does all of this mean to the environmental justice move-
ment? A close examination of Title VI remedies post-Sandoval re-
veals that under the right circumstances, Title VI can provide envi-
ronmental justice advocates with an effective remedy. In other cir-
cumstances, however, Title VI remedies may not be available to
achieve "environmental justice" or the costs of pursuing Title VI
remedies may be greater than the expected rewards. As such, envi-
ronmental justice attorneys should examine the appropriateness of
129. Id. at 508; see also id. at 499 (relying on the "beyond a doubt"
standard in denying the defendants' motions to dismiss the section
601 intentional discrimination, Equal Protection, and § 1983 claims).
130. Id. at 508. Judge Orlofsky also dismissed two claims based
directly on the section 602 disparate impact regulations: one that
sought to enforce the regulations though section 602 and another that
sought to enforce them through § 1983. Id. As the Supreme Court
and the Third circuit, respectively, had held that these rights of ac-
tion do not exist, the plaintiffs conceded that the court should prop-
erly dismiss those claims. Id. at 492 ("In light of the Supreme
Court's holding in Sandoval and the Third Circuit's recent holding
in this case the SCCIA Plaintiffs concede that their claims of dispa-
rate impact in violation of the EPA's implementing regulations un-
der § 602 of Title VI and § 1983 should be dismissed.").
131. See id. at 499 ("[I]t is inappropriate at this stage of these pro-
ceedings to argue the merits of the case .... If the NJDEP Defen-
dants acted within the parameters of the law in issuing the air per-
mits to SLC... they will have the opportunity to present supporting
evidence to this Court in a motion for summary judgment, or ulti-
mately at trial.").
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bringing a Title VI claim on an ad hoc basis with reference to the
desires and needs of the community in question.
What follows is an attempt to facilitate this decision-making proc-
ess by outlining the factors which affect the appropriateness of a Ti-
tle VI claim in a given circumstance, both on its own terms and in
relation to other possible courses of action. This discussion is not
intended to recommend what action is appropriate in a given circum-
stance, but rather to point out some aspects of Title VI action that
environmental justice attorneys may want to consider in deciding
whether to pursue remedies under the statute.
A. Title VI on its Own Terms
Judge Orlofsky's ruling that SCCIA could proceed with its section
601 intentional discrimination claim is certainly a victory for the
environmental justice movement. Though post-Sandoval there is no
real question that section 601 provides a private right of action for
intentional discrimination claims, 3 2 SCCIA's ability to state that
claim without alleging any overt manifestation of racial discrimina-
tion demonstrates that the evidentiary bar for such a claim may not
be unattainably high.133 Thus, extreme circumstances alone, such as
those in Waterfront South, may have enough probative value to
prove the discriminatory intent necessary to win a section 601 claim
and attorneys representing similarly-situated communities may be
able to use an such a claim to stop LULU sitings.
Still, environmental justice attorneys should be cautious in their
enthusiasm as SCCIA's survival of the motion to dismiss may yet
prove a Pyrrhic victory Given the high evidentiary burden of show-
ing a discriminatory intent and the lack of allegations of overt ra-
cism, Judge Orlofsky's denial of the motion to dismiss the section
601 claim may have simply postponed an inevitable victory by
NJDEP and SLC. A district court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
132. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279-80 (2001) (tak-
ing "as given" that Title VI section 601 provides a private right of
action and briefly explaining the basis for this conclusion). For a
discussion of the Court's treatment of this right in Sandoval, see su-
pra Part III.B.
133. See South Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 493 n.4 (listing the
thirteen specific allegations in SCCIA's second amended complaint).
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tion to dismiss accepts all allegations in the complaint as true.'
34
SCCIA must now produce enough evidence both to survive a motion
for summary judgment by the defendants and to prevail at trial.
The Supreme Court has foreclosed any direct remedy under Title
VI for unintentional discrimination' 35 and the Third and Ninth Cir-
cuits have found that § 1983 creates no remedy to enforce disparate
impact regulations.' 36 Therefore, Environmental justice advocates
should be somewhat cautious about relying on Title VI for a cause of
action without a "smoking gun" showing intentional racism on the
part of a recipient of EPA funds. Alleging that the issuing of permits
shows a discriminatory intent is one thing, proving it is quite another
and the inability to do so could prove fatal to many Title VI plain-
tiffs.
The potential costs of bringing a losing legal claim, under Title VI
or otherwise, could be great. First, the opportunity costs of litigation
can be enormous. Unempowered communities, by definition, lack
the financial, legal, and political resources of their more affluent
counterparts. Time and money "wasted" on a losing legal claim is
time and money which cannot be devoted to other activities calcu-
lated to oppose the siting of a LULU, such as social and political
activism.
Moreover, losing a legal battle could be devastating to a commu-
nity's morale. Lawyers are taught in law school to realistically as-
sess the effectiveness of legal claims and quickly learn that there are
very few sure answers in law. Lay persons, on the other hand, may
be more inclined to place all of their hopes on a legal claim, perhaps
134. Id. at 493.
135. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280 ("it is... beyond dispute that §
601 prohibits only intentional discrimination."); id. at 293 ("Neither
as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an
intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regu-
lations promulgated under § 602. We therefore hold that no such
right of action exists.").
136. See South Camden 111, 274 F.3d 771, 790-91 (3rd Cir. 2001)
(holding that section 602 disparate impact regulations cannot be en-
forced though 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)); Save Our Valley v. Sound
Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 1983 provides
no private right of action for a violation of the United States De-
partment of Transportation's Title VI section 602 disparate impact
regulations).
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because lay persons are more likely to focus on the equitable merits
of their claims rather than the legal merits.' 37 A loss in court could
then destroy community morale and undermine other efforts to fight
the siting of the present LULU, or even future LULUs. As one envi-
ronmental justice attorney noted: in communities, "[t]here is a reli-
ance on legal action, and no matter how much the lawyer says 'don't
count on it,' they count on it."' 138 Thus, environmental justice attor-
neys should seriously assess the facts surrounding the siting and
permitting of the LULU they intend to fight and whether they give
rise to a winnable claim of intentional discrimination before settling
on a Title VI cause of action.
Of course, the potential costs of bringing a claim under section
601, or those associated with pursuing any other legal course of ac-
tion, do not necessarily make bringing such a claim a bad idea. In
fact, any course of action will have its uncertainty and its costs, and
choosing no action is not normally a satisfactory answer. The key
for environmental justice attorneys in deciding whether to bring a
section 601 claim is making informed decisions and appropriate rec-
ommendations that take into account a wide variety of factors and
information.
When environmental justice attorneys decide to bring a Title VI
claim, they should not forget the side effects of legal action. A Title
VI claim can give environmental justice groups bargaining power,
even where the outcome of a section 601 claim may be uncertain.
The existence of a viable claim can create opportunities for settle-
ment where such settlements might achieve a mutually beneficial
result. Moral, ethical, 139 and legal 14 concerns counsel against bring-
137. Indeed, by thinking more in terms of "justice" than in terms of
law, community groups may fail to understand how a court could
possibly deny them relief, and should their claim fail in court, lose
faith in the legal system as a whole.
138. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 22, at 47 (quoting Philadel-
phia public interest lawyer Jerome Balter).
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble: A Law-
yer's Responsibility [5] ("A lawyer should use the law's procedures
only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others.").
140. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (b) (providing that "by presenting to
the court ... a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney.
. . is certifying that ... (1) it is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
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ing a claim solely for the purpose of achieving a bargaining position,
but this does not preclude the use of that power when legitimately
gained.' 4 1 While developers may never agree to scrap a proposed
LULU, bargaining can create opportunities for community groups to
gain rights of access and inspection, stricter emissions standards, the
construction of alternative routes (so that in the case of Waterfront
South, the additional truck traffic could be diverted around the
community), or even an agreement from the company to "buy out"
owners of adversely affected property.
Additionally, by providing access to a judicial forum, section 601
remedies may prove extremely effective at giving members of poor
or minority communities something they may covet greatly: a me-
dium for expression. The ability to be heard and understood can be
extremely valuable, especially to people who feel they have been
ignored by the system. A section 601 claim may allow a poor or
minority community its "day in court.". 1
42
Determining that Title VI may be useful in achieving "environ-
mental justice" in some communities cannot end the analysis. The
statute's effectiveness for the national movement, must be examined
for inherent weaknesses which limit its ability to achieve "environ-
mental justice" for all marginalized communities in the United
increase in the costs of litigation... ); Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (c) ("If ... the
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated the court may
... impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or
parties that have violated subdivision (b).").
141. See generally Janet V. Siegel, Negotiating for Environmental
Justice: Turning Polluters into "Good Neighbors" Through Col-
laborative Bargaining, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 147, 171-72 (2002)
(suggesting that environmental justice groups use bargaining power
to force polluters to enter into legally binding "good neighbor"
agreements).
142. See RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX
LITIGATION 17 (3rd. ed. 1998) ("[I]t appears that being able to exer-
cise control over the handling of the proceeding has substantial value
to litigants even when the outcome is unsatisfactory to them. In
short, people value having their own day in court."). In addition,
litigation may give rise to an opportunity for alternative dispute reso-
lution, such as mediation, which focuses on interests rather than
rights and allows community members to express their views and
concerns.
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States. A careful examination reveals that two aspects of Title VI
render its remedies ultimately insufficient (though not necessarily
ineffective) for fully achieving the goals of the environmental justice
movement. 143 First, because Title VI only addresses discrimination
based on "race, color, or national origin,' ' 144 the statute offers no
remedy to communities which cannot make a prima facia showing
of a disproportionate demographic make-up, as compared to other
communities. Second, since section 601 only prohibits intentional
discrimination, 45 and post-Sandoval, it appears unlikely that section
602 regulations are privately enforceable, 146 Title VI remedies are
143. This Note defines the goal of the environmental justice
movement as preventing the disproportionate impact of locally unde-
sirable land uses on communities which are under-represented and
therefore marginalized, either politically, socially, or financially.
For an explanation of the appropriateness of this definition, as well
as its utility and limits, see supra Part II.B.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
145. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (taking "as
given" that section 601 of Title VI only addresses intentional dis-
crimination). It should be remembered that, though the EPA's dispa-
rate impact regulations are technically valid at this time, id. at 281,
private actors cannot enforce them, id. at 293.
146. Although Justice Stevens's dissent in Sandoval indicated that
§ 1983 could provide a vehicle to enforce section 602 disparate im-
pact regulations, Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
the Third and Ninth circuits have held that the regulations create no
private rights which § 1983 can protect, see Save Our Valley v.
Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that §
1983 prohibits the violation of rights not laws and therefore the
plaintiffs could not maintain a private right of action for violation of
the United States Department of Transportation's Title VI disparate
impact regulations as such regulations create laws to be complied
with by recipients, not rights protecting people affected by those re-
cipients); South Camden III, 274 F.3d 771, 790 (3d Cir. 2001) (hold-
ing that the regulations did not create a federal right which § 1983
could enforce). In any event, the Supreme Court's analysis in
Sandoval, discussed in Part III.B, supra, casts doubt on whether Ti-
tle VI disparate impact regulations are even valid, see Sandoval, 532
U.S. at 281 (assuming that Title VI disparate impact regulations are
valid even if Title VI only prohibits intentional discrimination but
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apparently unavailable to marginal communities which cannot show
that racial or ethnic discrimination drove the actions of a Title VI
recipient in choosing or approving the site.
Title VI prohibits racial and ethnic discrimination and its remedies,
by definition, are unavailable to communities which cannot show a
disproportionate demographic make-up based on either "race, color,
or national origin." 147 This prima facia requirement limits Title VI's
effectiveness in achieving "environmental justice" nationally for
essentially three reasons.
First, the remedy is essentially foreclosed to poor white communi-
ties that do not have a national origin identity, meaning that, relying
solely on Title VI, the movement could never protect all unempow-
ered communities. In fact, if transaction costs, not a racially dis-
criminatory motive, have led to the problem identified by the envi-
ronmental justice movement, focusing exclusively on Title VI reme-
dies could have the undesirable effect of making poor, white com-
munities even more attractive sites for LULUs. 14 8 In any event, the
very language of section 601, Title VI's general provision, renders
the statute an insufficient remedy to achieve "environmental justice"
for all.
Second, changes in state law may make it difficult to show that a
community is, in fact, disproportionately minority as compared to
the surrounding area. The same day that California voters elected
Arnold Schwarzenegger in the well-publicized recall election, they
defeated a ballot initiative which would have, unless federally pre-
cautioning that "considerable tension" exists between that assump-
tion and the Court's precedent), indicating that the § 1983 discussion
may be a moot point anyhow.
147. See, e.g., South Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 493 n.4
(D.N.J. 2003) (listing among the specific allegations made by
SCCIA: "a. The [NJ]DEP and Commissioner Shinn [now Campbell]
knew that the residents of Waterfront South and the surrounding
neighborhoods were predominately African-American and His-
panic.").
148. This is because the increased use of Title VI remedies by envi-
ronmental justice advocates would likely increase the transaction
costs associated with siting and permitting a LULU in a minority
community while not affecting the transaction costs in poor, white
communities, thus making sites in those communities more attractive
to developers.
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empted, severely undercut any Title VI claims. 149 Termed the "Ra-
cial Privacy Initiative," the measure sought to amend the California
Constitution1 50 to prohibit the State from classifying "any individual
by race, ethnicity, color, or national origin in the operation of public
education, public contracting, or public employment." 
1 5
'
To be sure, the Initiative contained a provision that allowed for
Federal preemption. 152 Still, its existence would surely hamper the
ability of community groups to bring Title VI claims, unless and
until a court determined that the Initiative conflicted with Title VI
and that such data must be kept. Though the Initiative was defeated
and is not a barrier to Title VI claims at present, its sponsor, Ward
Connerly, has indicated he will attempt to reintroduce the Initiative
in the future. 53 As such, environmental justice attorneys and organ-
izers considering Title VI action should pay attention to how this
issue plays out in California, as well as whether "racial privacy" is
proposed elsewhere.
Third, the destructiveness and divisiveness of race, especially in
the United States, should give environmental justice attorneys some
149. See Commentary: Losing Proposition Series: Seiler, ORANGE
Co. REGISTER, Oct. 9, 2003, available at 2003 WL 7012055 (dis-
cussing the defeat of Proposition 54, the Racial Privacy Initiative).
150. The Initiative was proposed to be added as section 32 of Arti-
cle I of the California Constitution and is available at
http://www.racialprivacy.org/content/language.php (last visited Feb.
24, 2004).
151. Racial Privacy Initiative § 32(a).
152. Racial Privacy Initiative § 32(m) ("This section shall be self-
executing. If any part or parts of this section are found to be in con-
flict with federal law or the United States Constitution, the section
shall be implemented to the maximum extent that federal law and the
United States Constitution permit. Any provision held invalid shall
be severable from the remaining portions of this section.").
153. Tanya Schevitz, Prop. 54 Defeated Soundly: State Initiative
on Racial Privacy Raised Issues about Health, Education, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 8, 2003, at A.12 available at 2003 WL 3764977
("[Ward] Connerly has said he will make another go at a racial pri-
vacy initiative. He plans to reintroduce it in a couple of years after
reworking what he called 'flawed' and confusing language. He will
turn to opponents in the medical community for help in crafting lan-
guage to ensure it would protect health care.").
[VOL. XVI
TITLE VI OR BUST
pause before employing Title VI, or any other race-based remedy, to
achieve its goals. Focusing on race may limit the scope of discus-
sion and planning and distort the goals of the environmental justice
movement. White members of a community relying on Title VI may
feel, or actually be, marginalized, undercutting support in an already
fractured community.
Similarly, the emotional charge associated with claims of bigotry
and discrimination may foreclose otherwise potentially fruitful nego-
tiations between community leaders and corporate or government
officials. Members of the community may be unwilling to seek
agreement with those whom they see as racial oppressors, and corpo-
rate or government officials may be extremely offended by the alle-
gations and become similarly intransigent. In sum, the racial com-
ponent of Title VI claims, if too central to a citizens' group's activi-
ties, can actually reduce the group's effectiveness either by margin-
alizing support or by creating a combative environment that encour-
ages competing factions to entrench themselves within their respec-
tive positions.
Additionally, Title VI is an insufficient remedy for achieving "en-
vironmental justice" nationally because the statute only prohibits
intentional discrimination. Environmental injustice, as defined in
this Note,154 goes to the effect of a LULU on a marginalized com-
munity, not the mental state of those that chose to site it there. Be-
cause of this, relying solely on Title VI excludes (at least in theory)
communities affected by LULUs not sited or permitted with a dis-
criminatory purpose in mind and shifts the focus of the environ-
mental justice movement from helping disadvantaged communities
maintain a clean living environment to punishing "evildoers" who
seek out minorities. Thus, Title VI remedies not only exclude mar-
ginalized communities which have been impacted by LULUs sited
without discriminatory intent, but also transform the role of the envi-
ronmental justice attorney from protector of the feeble to prosecutor
of the malevolent, to the possible detriment of injured communities
and the environmental justice movement as a whole.
B. Title VI in a Broader Context
Title VI does not exist in a vacuum; alternative courses of action
must be examined to determine what role its remedies can effec-
154. See supra Part II.B.
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tively play as part of a broader plan for "environmental justice."
Events in South Camden 55 have been quite instructive on this point.
Environmental justice attorneys and commentators watching the le-
gal events unfold in South Camden156 should be sure not to overlook
the overall strategy employed by SCCIA's attorneys, who have been
exemplary in their tenacity and ingenuity. In spite of a Supreme
Court decision which nullified their first preliminary injunction and
a Third Circuit decision which directly reversed their second, the
attorneys continued to test the viability of Title VI remedies' 57 while
adding other legal theories of recovery. In its second amended com-
plaint, SCCIA brought not only a claim of intentional discrimination
under section 601, but also claims of private and public nuisance' 5
8
and violations of the Federal Fair Housing Act.' 5
9
155. South Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.N.J 2003); South
Camden Ii, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001); South Camden II, 145 F.
Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001); South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d 446
(D.N.J. 2001).
156. See cases cited in note 155.
157. This time in the form of a section 601 intentional discrimina-
tion claim.
158. For Judge Orlofsky's decision concerning SCCIA's private
nuisance claim, see South Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 503-506
(denying SLC's motion to dismiss SCCIA's private nuisance claim
because SCCIA (1) was not required under New Jersey law to show
that SLC's facility was in violation of applicable regulations or laws
concerning environmental emissions to state a claim of private nui-
sance and (2) had alleged the requisite private harm). For Judge Or-
lofsky's decision concerning SCCIA's public nuisance claim, see id.
at 506-508 (granting the motion to dismiss SCCIA's public nuisance
claim because SCCIA did not allege that the activities of SLC were
not "fully regulated," a prerequisite to a public nuisance claim under
New Jersey law unless the activity is in violation of regulations).
159. Id. at 508. The Federal Fair Housing Act was passed as Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81,
and is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000). For Judge Orlof-
sky's decision concerning SCCIA's Federal Fair Housing Act claim,
see South Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 499-503 (concluding that
NJDEP does not provide housing services as contemplated by the
Fair Housing Act and, therefore, cannot be sued under the Act's pro-
visions).
[VOL. XVI
TITLE VI OR BUST
Given the uncertainty surrounding Title VI remedies at present, as
well as the general uncertainty associated with legal action, SCCIA's
attorneys' example of buttressing a claim by employing multiple
causes of action provides a helpful blueprint for other environmental
justice attorneys. Of course, the causes of action listed in SCCIA's
second amended complaint do not exhaust the legal remedies poten-
tially available to environmental justice attorneys. At least one
commentator has suggested using the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment' 60 and similar state provisions to achieve "environ-
mental justice. ' 161 There is always potential for innovative attor-
neys to adapt other legal doctrines to the needs and goals of the envi-
ronmental justice movement or the particular communities they are
trying to protect. 162 By considering several different claims, envi-
ronmental justice activists can avoid having to rely upon Title VI
remedies, especially in cases where a race-neutral remedy may be
more appropriate. 163
This does not mean, however, that environmental justice attorneys
should simply bring any claim they can imagine. Strategic, moral,
160. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation").
161. See generally Sandra L. Geiger, Note, An Alternative Legal
Tool for Pursuing Environmental Justice: The Takings Clause, 31
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 201 (1998) (examining the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a remedy for environmental jus-
tice).
162. See, e.g., Rachel Paras, Note, Relief at the End of a Winding
Road: Using the Third Party Beneficiary Rule and Alternative Ave-
nues to Achieve Environmental Justice, 77 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 157
(2003) (suggesting that environmental justice attorneys may be able
to bring claims as third party beneficiaries to spending contracts be-
tween the federal government and state regulatory agencies and,
thereby, sue to enforce EPA's Title VI disparate impact regulations
and mentioning other possible civil and criminal remedies available);
Siegel, supra note 141 (suggesting that environmental justice groups
use the bargaining power gained through litigation and administra-
tive process to force polluters to enter into legally binding "good
neighbor" agreements).
163. For a discussion of the potential dangers of relying on a race-
based claim, see supra Part IV.A.
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ethical,164 legal, 165 and financial concerns all counsel against bring-
ing frivolous or otherwise dubious claims. Rather than simply look-
ing for colorable claims or testing new legal theories in an almost
academic pursuit, environmental justice attorneys should assess all
potential legal claims with respect to the costs associated with bring-
ing them (financial, temporal, and opportunity), their likelihood of
success, and the reward attained should they succeed (that is,
whether the remedy allows for damages, equitable relief, or both).
Action under section 601 of Title VI offers the full range of reme-
dies, both equitable and legal, 166 but winning a section 601 claim
requires proof of intentional discrimination based on "race, color, or
national origin." Thus, winning on the merits can be a difficult and
expensive proposition and a section 601 claim is unavailable to non-
minority communities. In deciding whether to bring a Title VI
claim, these factors must be weighed against similar factors pertain-
ing to other causes of action (especially where strategic or economic
issues make bringing both claims mutually exclusive).
For example, the only remedy available under the Takings Clause
is monetary relief in the form of "just compensation" for the prop-
erty "taken" by government action. 167 As such, a Takings claim,
164. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble: A Law-
yer's Responsibility [4] ("A lawyer should use the law's procedures
only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others.").
165. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) (providing that "by presenting
to the court ... a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attor-
ney..., is certifying that... (1) it is not being presented for any im-
proper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the costs of litigation; (2) the claims ... are war-
ranted by existing law or by nonfrivolous argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of
new law; (2) the allegations ... have evidentiary support .... ");
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (c) ("If... the court determines that subdivision
(b) has been violated the court may... impose an appropriate sanc-
tion upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated sub-
division (b)").
166. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (con-
cluding that section 601 provides both equitable and legal relief to be
"beyond dispute").
167. The final clause of the Fifth Amendment provides "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
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unlike a section 601 claim, cannot enjoin a LULU unless the gov-
ernment actor refuses to compensate the plaintiff. Still, a Takings
claim only requires the plaintiff to prove that an injury was caused
by a government "'taking," rendering irrelevant issues of race or
motive. Because of this, a Takings claim will sometimes be more
attractive than a section 601 claim, despite the limited relief avail-
able.
Focusing solely on legal remedies to accomplish the goals of the
environmental justice movement may itself be a strategic mistake.
Activists concerned with legal action may ignore the political and
economic aspects of environmental justice struggles. 16 8 According
to Professors Luke W. Cole and Sheila R. Foster, because "environ-
mental justice struggles are at the heart of political economic strug-
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Implicitly, then, the government (state or
federal) is empowered to "take" private property "for public use."
See id. All that the Takings Clause requires is that the government
pays the injured party "just compensation" in return. See id. The
government, however, can choose whether to compensate for a
"permanent taking" or to desist whatever activity has effected a "tak-
ing" and avoid liability for a "permanent taking." See Lucas v. S.
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 n.17 (1992) ("Of
course, the state may rescind and thereby avoid having to pay com-
pensation for a permanent deprivation."); see also id. ("But 'where
the [regulation has] already worked a taking of all use of property,
no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective."'); First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) ("Once a court
determines that a taking has occurred, the government retains the
whole range of options already available . . . ."); id. ("[W]here the
government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of
the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the
taking was effective.").
168. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 22, at 121-22 ("Litigation can
be inappropriate for, or unavailable to, communities struggling for
environmental justice. Because environmental justice struggles are
political and economic struggles, legal responses have fallen woe-
fully short of aiding communities and in some cases have hurt their
struggles.").
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gles, a legal response is often inappropriate or unavailable. In fact,
bringing a lawsuit may ensure certain loss of the struggle at hand or
cause significant disempowerment of community residents."'
' 69
Thus, bringing a claim under Title VI may sometimes be inappropri-
ate, not because Title VI is not the appropriate cause of action, but
because legal action itself is inappropriate.
Cole and Foster state that for some environmental justice advo-
cates the goal of "building viable community organizations and re-
gional networks" p redominates over "winning any particular envi-
ronmental battle." 0 If coalition and network building is the proper
goal for activists, environmental justice attorneys should turn their
focus away from legal remedies, such as Title VI, and look for other
ways to assist community activism. In addition to the analytical
skills attorneys can bring to the coalition-building process, their legal
expertise can be invaluable in protecting the political and free speech
rights of activists, facilitating the community action process.
The key to the success of the environmental justice attorney, it
would seem, is integrative "outside the box" thinking which can help
determine which of the full range of available remedies, including
those available under Title VI, are appropriate for assisting the indi-
vidual communities they represent demand equal protection from
environmental hazards.
V. CONCLUSION
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is presently an uncertain
and shrinking remedy for achieving environmental justice. The only
cause of action available under the statute is through section 601,
which only prohibits intentional discrimination. Further, disparate
impact regulations promulgated under section 602 may not even be
valid, and even if they are valid, they are likely not enforceable
through § 1983, despite Justice Stevens's optimism in his Sandoval
dissent. Thus, a community group looking to enjoin an EPA recipi-
ent from siting or permitting a LULU must prove that the recipient's
actions were motivated by the intent to discriminate against that
community on the basis of "race, color, or national origin," hardly a
delightful prospect for environmental justice attorneys.
169. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 21, at 129.
170. Id. at 132.
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In its present state, the law concerning the private right of action
available under Title VI is uncertain and not encouraging for envi-
ronmental justice activists and attorneys. Perhaps in time, proceed-
ings in South Camden17 1 or elsewhere will answer the questions sur-
rounding Title VI and allow environmental justice attorneys to more
easily evaluate whether they should bring a claim under section 601
(or, should the Supreme Court or other circuits disagree with the
Third and Ninth Circuits, a claim to enforce section 602 disparate
impact regulations under § 1983). In the interim, it is critical to the
success of the environmental justice movement that its activists and
attorneys recognize the potential benefits, costs, limitations, and un-
certainty associated with Title VI claims and use Title VI and other
remedies appropriately to fulfill the needs of a given community.
Title VI is not now, nor will it ever be, a "magic bullet" for envi-
ronmental justice attorneys, but if used properly, it can be an impor-
tant part of their arsenal.
171. South Camden IV, 254 F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.N.J 2003); South
Camden Ill, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001); South Camden II, 145 F.
Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001); South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d 446
(D.N.J. 2001).
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